Thursday, August 21, 2008

And Then There Were Five: IAC/InterActiveCorp's Spin-off



After feeling the heat from disgruntled investors, Barry Diller has now succeeded at splitting IAC into five publicly traded companies. The parent IAC, until the spin, was an amalgamation of internet sites, cable networks, travel services, and mortgage lending. These groups had little in common (not a lot of 'synergies').

The split finalized today after nearly a year of paying high adviser (lawyers and bankers) fees.
The hope is that the svelter IAC will put the $1.3B in cash it extracted out of its other business to work.

However, Moody's slashed its corporate rating to junk due to "the significant reduction in IAC's scale and business diversity with the spin-off of approximately 78% of its revenue and approximately 73% of segment EBITDA." No matter. With a huge pile of cash and less side businesses to worry about, IAC just might fare well. Investors seem to think so: shares traded up over 8% today.

But what of the other four?

TicketMaster (TKTM) received very little detail in past IAC SEC filings. Independence will be great for a seemingly neglected company. Hopefully, the new company will fight Live Nation, a former customer (14% of revenue).

Tree.com (Lendingtree.com) is still an attractive site for consumers to shop for mortgage loans. Lack of company financials makes it too early to say.

HSN (Home Shopping Network): there are few things in today's economic environment that worry me more than strapped customers' willingness to sit and watch a channel (or surf the website) to buy blenders and gold-plated wrist watches.

ILG (Interval Leisure Group): this is a timeshare company. At just over 2x sales and with recurring revenue from gullible consumers, ILG's valuation looks decent.


The greatest joy is the absence of historical line-by-line economics, especially for the four subsidiaries. Bank analysts love to extrapolate these items into the future to justify their "target prices." Lack of such detail, coupled with forced selling (some institutions will have to sell shares of the smaller companies), and the relatively new entrepreneurial zeal of the new bosses, should create some potential buying opportunities. You won't see that on the Home Shopping Network.


---------
Disclosure: None
Image: http://aplasticcentral.com/images/then%20there%20were%205.jpg

Sunday, August 10, 2008

An earnings followup


Orbitz

The bookings question: overall, bookings rose to $3B, or 4%. This was a tale of two stories: international jumped 41% to $476M; domestic remained basically flat at -1% growth, or $2.6B. The air side of the bookings did less well, down 13% due to a decline in U.S. volume.

This segment of the travel business is tough: margins are negative, returns on equity capital are decreasing and I'm not sure what edge they have over the competition.

Would I like to run the business over the next five years? No. What would I do as a competitor to erode Orbiz' business, I'm not sure. I'd take a pass on this company though fundamentally it doesn't look like a bubble stock.



Cowen

The company is trading at close to cash because of the deterioration of its model. The future of the super-small boutique firm is looking not so hot as panicked companies and investors seek the comfort of larger and more established banks (though their blunders as of late have been huge). At an industry high employee compensation-to-revenue ratio of 60% +, any reduction of business (investment banking is down 32%), cash on hand will get eaten up as the Cowen continues to operate as a going concern. If I were management, I'd look for a bigger player to buy me.



Papa John's

Wheat and cheese prices are rising fast (100%+ and 26% year-over-year). 35-40% of Papa's cost is cheese. The pizza world is too competitive to pass those price increases on to customers. This will pressure margins. Look for the cheapest (Little Caesar's) and the highest-end niche players (The Pie Pizza where I live) to do less poorly. I love pizza. I'm not to keen on pizza economics.


Perini

It's growing somewhere, oddly enough in Cali. and Vegas. That's saying something in today's environment. Revenue is up 21% and its backlog book of construction business is at $6.8B. With an enterprise value of $400M and $5B in sales, coupled with a pristine balance sheet and $460M in cash in the bank, it may be time to say hello to construction.



Beazer

It's adjusted balance sheet is still a mystery. If you're looking at placing a bet with a home builder, try DR Horton or NVR. Both are in better financial shape and run businesses I'd rather operate. They're also the builders I'd be least enthusiastic about competing against.


-----------
Disclosure: None

Sunday, August 3, 2008

Earnings Time

Corporate executives are great salesmen. Many have climbed the ladder through actually sales talent, or by selling themselves. One of their preferred pitches once they reach the top is the case for their stock: it's always undervalued by the market.

Quarterly earnings releases are important market signals since a company has to earn real money (either now or in the future) to be worth something. But earnings reports can also be rife with overly optimistic management speak and fuzzy accounting assumptions. Management will border on dishonesty to prove their case. That's why, with no significant research budget, Faro relies on basic economics, common sense, and financials as the foundation for investment decisions.

So when analyzing the earnings releases, look for companies with potential economic signals (Are people eating out less? Do moviegoers habits change in a bad economy? Are people paying their credit card bills?) True, these are lagging economic indicators, but econ is not known for its predictive value. Since learning is cumulative, even if management is full of it, you'll be able to take away useful bits of info. And, you'll be able to hang this on your problem solving matrix framework (PSMF). I just made that up.

As we're in the middle of "earnings season," each day of this week there's a call which is probably worth paying attention to.

-------------------------
Monday

Orbitz (online travel). How bad are leisure and business travel bookings?

Tuesday

Cowen (boutique investment bank). Why is this company trading at close to cash? 116M net cash vs. 122M market cap.

Wednesday

Papa John's (pizzas). How are commodity costs affecting margins?

Thursday

Perini (general contracting and construction management). What's changed in the last 12 months?

Friday

Beazer (home builder). What would its adjusted balance sheet really look like?

-------------------------

Enjoy.

Thursday, July 24, 2008

$1 Trillion

This article, written by famed bond guru Bill Gross of PIMCO, paints a bleak picture of the current financial environment.


In my opinion, banking, at least over the next generation, will be drastically different:

1) gone are the days of no-doc teaser home loans.
2) banks are now much more risk averse (less willing to lend to anyone with just a pulse).
3) many more banks will fail.

What America needs is the Leave-it-to-Beaver era of thrift, honesty and a 20% down payment. I would not lend to someone who didn't pass that filter. I don't have much faith in people not wanting to keep up with the Joneses.

Sadly, however, this crisis means Uncle Sam's place in our lives just got bigger. America will live with much of this. Remember, some of the most odious Acts and Laws were passed several decades ago (e.g., Social Security). So be leery of any measures to 'save' homeowners. Few find it politically expedient to speak the truth: the banks lied; the borrowers lied; the mortgage lenders lied. That's a scary combination. But all should pay the price before the taxpayer carries the burden.

As Buffett said: "Be greedy when others are fearful and fearful when others are greedy." There's blood in the streets now, but expect more. Nevertheless, I am optimistic about the long-term ingenuity of America's creative engines.

Sunday, July 13, 2008

On Timeshares and Psychology

There's something about mostly tan, thin, vacation-theme clothed, and universally happy sales people that breeds distrust. This past weekend, my wife and I sat through our third timeshare presentation in as many years. We're not interested, but companies now dangle bigger rewards as incentives to come sit for 90 minutes; sales presentations can also be a great education in psychological persuasion and in how to see through fuzzy math. It was a 4th of July weekend well spent at a Worldmark office, a subsidiary of Wyndam (Ticker: WYN).

The picture

4.4 million US households own vacation ownership interests (a euphemism for timeshares). For Worldmark, The average age is 52 and the median household income is $74,000; this is the middle class, the I-can-feel-retirement-coming crowd. Again, this is the median number so half are older and have are younger. All are bad at math, however.



We were probably referred by a friend or acquaintance (they offer extra perks for referrals). The sales building was located in a typical office park but in an upper-middle class area of town. The parking area was newly paved and partially shaded with immature trees. The entrance was simple yet attractive and on 95 degree day, the cool office air felt almost too cold. The facilities had the disadvantage of being located off-site. There was no personal tour to entice would-be buyers with extra big jet tubs and high thread count sheets (or whatever they have). On-site tours account for 90% of Wyndam's timeshare sales though only 80% of sales close on-site.


Once settled in the office our sales rep (a twentysomething mother of two) offered us cookies and soda--an odd and unsatisfying menu given the mid-morning hour of our appointment. 10-15 couples of middle and young family age, joined us in what I'll call "why everyone needs to buy a Worldmark timeshare."


The Economics

Worldmark should make a profit, but it's how they present that bothers me.


The direct cost to the consumer are: 1) a lump sum payment, generally 10% down; financing is pre-approved at 17.9% (a stratospheric rate) though the average interest rate on 277,000 loans ($3.3 billion in total loans) is 12.5% (source: 2007 10K). This is still extremely high; 2) Maintenance fees* of $500-1,000 per year depending on the number of vacation credits (these are exchanged for days at any one of the company's 67 resorts.)


The numbers presented to us were vacation credits roughly equivalent to ten days per year for 55 years. The one time fee was $31,340 with an annual maintenance fee of $947.00, or $94.70 per day. The key factors in doing the math are the estimated average room rate increases over the next 55 years and the assumed alternative rate of return (the opportunity cost of capital) of the lump sum payment. Opportunity cost is one of the most important principles of any economics class.


Wordmark's assumed room rate inflation is 7.6% and is based on past 30 years. This number seems high and unlikely to continue. This is economic red flag number one in the presentation. Room rate inflation, according to form 10K, over the last 8 years has been closer to 4%. I make the assumption of an opportunity cost of capital based on the stock market (S&P 500) recent 30 year compounded annual growth rate of approximately 9%. 7-8% would probably be more appropriate.


In the pitch, she told us room rates averaged $150.00+; a higher hotel room rate makes it more appealing to lock in the rate today; it's also very dishonest. This is economic red flag number two. With a base room rate of $108 (the average daily hotel room rate for 2007 was $103.00 per 2007 10K) and 7.6% room rate inflation over 55 years at 10 days per year you will have paid $725k for hotel rooms assuming you 'vacation' as they say you should.

But what would you have given up (what's the opportunity cost for saying yes)? If you invested the $31,340 lump sum payment in the S&P 500 over the course of the same 55 year period, with an assumed return of just over 9% you'd have over $3.1 millions dollars. Add the yearly fixed maintenance fees of 947.00 and you'd have another $1.3 million.


The pitch compared future dollars to present dollars (the lump sum payment you'll make up front)--an apples to soggy watermelon comparison. This is economic red flag number three. Clearly $725k in future hotel bills looks cheap next to the $4.4 million opportunity cost. (This assumes the $31k lump sump payment is made in cash; to finance 90% of this and to add the 12.5% rate financing to equation would look even less favorable from the consumers perspective.


Securitizations


After too many cokes, the opaque math and bombardment of vacation imagery, a middle age couple decides to go for it. Of a motley group of 15-20 or so couples, they are perhaps the only to buy. The others will either sleep on it (rarely a bad policy), or just say it's too much money.


A check for 10% down is cut, the contract is signed and the couple walks with gifts equal to some reimbursement of their time. The salesman smiles looking for approval from his now content supervisor, while other sales reps curse that others were too cautious and rational.

When a deal is closed the firm sells the loan within 30-90 days as part of a receivables securitization (loans packaged and sold to investors). With a spread of 7.1% (WYN borrows at 5.4%--per 2007 10K--and lends at 12.5% for vacation ownership loans) over the standard 10-15 year period for such a loan, banking becomes the bread and butter of the business.


The present value of such a loan is worth 33% more than if the lending were done at 3.00% above borrowing costs (more reasonable given the credit of timeshare owners).


Over the last three years, securitization of customer receivables has generated $1.5 billion in gains for Wyndam, the parent company. The pursuit of profit is hardly shady, but free cash flow (what the company makes from it's core business of hotels, vacation rentals, and timeshares) over the sames period has netted a mere $148 million. To sell pools of loans is 10 times as profitable as the company's general operations. This helps to understand the motivation of receivables financing.


The psychology


So why would someone buy a timeshare if the numbers look so bad for the consumer and so great for the company?


As we proceeded through the sales pitch, I took down mental notes of some of the principles touched on in Cialdini's book, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. I also jotted down numbers, as the sales rep nervously observed, since this drives the rationale for accepting or rejecting decisions of this kind.


Every sales experience is deeply rooted in human psychology. Cialdini's book is so influential that upon reading it, Charlie Munger of Berkshire Hathaway, gifted the author one Berkshire Class A share. I've recommended this book to no fewer than 10 people. I've outlined some key points used in the timeshare sales-pitch.


Social Proof

Everyone is doing it. A common refrain from high school, this is ubiquitous in the world. When I said that this didn't make economic sense, she replied: "If this didn't make sense, we wouldn't be in business."

Reciprocation

There's a powerful example from the book: In a WWI battle situation, a German surprised an enemy soldier in no-man's land while the enemy was eating a sandwich. The enemy soldier surprisingly reached out and gave the German some of his food. The stunned German soldier, under command to bring back any captors for interrogating, returned alone to face the wrath of his superiors

Worldmark offers free cookies, coke, two or three nights in a resort, gas cards, and $100.00 restaurant gift card: the least you could do is become a "vacation ownership" member as a return for all these favors.

Scarcity


We received a call the day before wanting to push back our time 2 hrs. When we declined they offered us a $50.00 gas card. We kept our original reservation. They tried to create the aura of scarcity. Panicky financial decisions are rarely good ones.

Liking


We like others like us. Timeshare pitchers are young, attractive, tan, and tend to favor Hawaiian shirts over more traditional dress since we all like the idea of worry-free vacationing.

Authority


Worldmark uses AAA as the authority source for future room rate inflation. But you should ask: Is this authority truly an expert? And, are these statistics misstated or cherry picked?


How can we say no?


The easiest was to say no is avoidance. If that's not an option, then we must accept offers only for what they fundamentally are. Hence, the focus on the economics. Timeshares at best are a ripoff, at worst, sales associates (or sales executives as they may be called to inflate the importance of their jobs) present a skewed view of the world through contemptibly misleading numbers.


--------


Disclosure:

None



Notes:
*"These fees generally are used to renovate and replace furnishings, pay operating, maintenance and cleaning costs, pay management fees and expenses, and cover taxes (in some states), insurance and other related costs. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, as the owner of unsold inventory at resorts, also pays maintenance fees to property owners’ associations in accordance with the legal requirements of the states or jurisdictions in which the resorts are located. In addition, at certain newly developed resorts, Wyndham Vacation Resorts enters into subsidy agreements with the property owners’ associations to cover costs that otherwise would be covered by annual maintenance fees payable with respect to vacation ownership interests that have not yet been sold."

Saturday, July 5, 2008

Some thoughts concerning timeshares

There's something about mostly tan, thin, vacation-themed clothed, and universally happy sales people that breeds distrust. This weekend, my wife and I sat through our third timeshare presentation--not because we're interested, but because companies dangle bigger carrots as incentives to come sit for 90 minutes, and it can be a great education.

I'm compiling some industry and company specific figures on the economics of timeshares to share with friends, family, and eager readers. Results will post within a few days.

The verdict: don't buy one (this shouldn't be a giveaway for most).

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Executive Writing

Nothing in the business world draws more ire than "high" executive pay. Ask a doctor what they think and they'll most likely declare: "I save lives. What do execs do?" Faro discussed management pay in a previous post and argued in favor of rational, shareholder-friendly payouts for top talent. Like a good exercise program, the advice is rarely heeded.

How executives get their jobs is worth pondering. In addition to talent (for most) and energy, much of the rung-climbing success is due to politicking and affability. Companies understandably gravitate to likable people. Though being a nice guy shouldn't be as big of a part of the equation. Clear communication and honesty should be near the top of the list.

You don't want a CEO who's just a consensus builder and good golfer. But that's how many do it. Too many, perhaps, come from smooth talking sales backgrounds. These are 'yes' people.

You have to wonder, why these 'yes' people want to be CEO of a big company. Is it the power, the money, the ego? The lifestyle and the lavish houses, however, are appealing. In an interview with Fortune, a famous rich guy named Warren said he'd rather be a paperboy than be the CEO of GE. Whether he meant this post- or pre-billionaire status is kind of irrelevant. People should place a high value on their time.

Well, what do CEOs do? They lead the strategy of the company. They motivate. They make sure all the pieces of the puzzle fit and that, ideally, the value of the firm increases over time. They attend meetings. They have secretaries who arrange their schedules. They golf. They attend fancy dinners. They hire and fire. They are scapegoats. They put in long hours (however productive they may be). They also should write the annual shareholders' letter. This seemingly easy task is, more often than not, plagued with ambiguity and buzzwords.

Below is the Fresh Del Monte 2007 letter to shareholders. Cleaning this up would be messy. The astute reader should be leery when only GAAP figures are mentioned, but also skeptical of language like "excluding", "other charges", "accretive" (though this term is not used below, it is very common when justifying a potential acquisition), etc. This doesn't mean the business is poor; the presentation is just bad. The poor writing also reflects unclear thinking. It doesn't have to be poetry, but it should be better than MBA-level "strategic" writing. But maybe strategic is what Wallstreet is looking for.


Areas of concern in the letter are in red. Faro's comments are bolded and in brackets.



__________




"Two thousand and seven was one of the best years in the history of Fresh Del Monte Produce. During this period, we benefited from the many improvements we made in all of our business lines, which restored Fresh Del Monte’s track record of creating enhanced shareholder value [I'd mention the 2007 stock performance of +125%. That's impressive.] To achieve this goal, we continued to streamline our fresh and fresh cut businesses, eliminating unprofitable products in our fresh-cut line, while maximizing production and driving efficiencies in our logistics networks. In addition, we improved banana contract pricing in North America, countering higher production and logistics costs. We expanded our global customer base, and we began to serve a number of new markets [I like numbers].


We also continued to leverage the power of the Del Monte® brand to create new inroads in fast-growing Middle East markets. Much of our success in these and other markets is due to enduring consumer confidence in our 115-year-old brand, which symbolizes quality, freshness and reliability. In addition, we aggressively repositioned our prepared food business by streamlining production and distribution [how? don't give away your secrets, but how].As a result of our solid operating achievements in 2007, we were able to deliver substantially improved performance across a range of financial metrics. Earnings per diluted share climbed to $3.22, compared with $0.10 per diluted share for the year ended 2006, excluding asset impairment, restructuring and other charges [i.e., exluding the bad stuff]. Net sales for the year increased to $3.4 billion, compared with $3.2 billion in 2006. Gross profit for the year rose to $364.9 million, compared with $189.4 million in the prior year. Net income for the year increased to $179.8 million, compared with a net loss of $142.2 million in 2006.


We are justifiably proud of our performance in 2007, particularly as the prior year had been one of the most difficult we had ever endured. In 2006, we faced a number of hurdles, including higher energy and production costs [you state it later in the 10k, why not mention impact of energy costs in $. What about foreign currency? That's on my mind too] . The fact that we were able to overcome the lingering effects of those factors in 2007 is a testament to the expertise and commitment of our management team and the dedication of our 35,000 employees around the world. It is also a powerful endorsement of our business model. Our mission is centered on increasing shareholder value [who's isn't]. To fulfill this mission, we set out each day focused on offering products and services that meet the needs of our customers and enable us to improve profitability. While this mission requires disciplined implementation, it also calls for flexibility and resilience—two inherent qualities that we demonstrated yet again in 2007, when in spite of continuing cost pressures, we delivered some of the strongest financial results in our history [examples would be great].


As we advance through 2008, we are optimistic about our future. Fresh Del Monte Produce continues to perform well around the world, in part because of our concerted efforts to improve our operating efficiencies and reduce costs. These efforts continue, and we remain vigilant about meeting the continuing challenges of fluctuating costs related to production, transportation, fuel and packaging. We also remain firmly committed to prudently growing the Company, improving our operations, expanding in new geographic areas and developing new products to meet consumer demand. As we steadily pursue these measures, we warmly thank all of our shareholders—including those of you who took a first-time stake in our Company in 2007—for your continued support."

__________


Source: http://library.corporate-ir.net/library/10/108/108461/items/285073/FDP07AR.pdf

Disclosure: none